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WILL GIDEON’S TRUMPET SOUND A NEW MELODY? 
The Globalization of Constitutional Values and  
Its Implications for a Right to  
Equal Justice in Civil Cases 
Hon. Earl Johnson, Jr.1 
 
If the motto ‘and justice for all’ becomes ‘and justice for those who can  
afford it,’ we threaten the very underpinnings of our social contract. 
 
    Ronald George, Chief Justice of California 
    State of the Judiciary speech, September 2001 
 
In an article published a quarter century ago, I wrote with a note of 
optimism: 
Some propositions are so elemental and some developments so 
long overdue that once implemented most Americans wonder how 
democratic society could have functioned any other way.  
Women’s suffrage, the elimination of de jure racial discrimination 
and the right to counsel for indigent felony defendants are among 
these phenomena. . . . [Likewise] [a]t some point, Americans will 
look back and ask how concepts like “due process,” “equal 
protection of the law” and “equal justice under law” were anything 
but hollow phrases, while our society still tolerated the denial of 
counsel to low-income civil litigants.2   
 As it turned out, in just the three years after that article was published, the 
highest courts on two continents had occasion to address the issue of a 
constitutional right to counsel in civil cases.  Those courts reached very 
different conclusions, however. 
Many readers are familiar with what happened on one of those 
continents—North America.  In 1981, the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of N.C. held that our 
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Constitution’s guarantee of “due process” does not provide a right to 
counsel in civil cases, even when the government is taking away a mother’s 
parental rights to her children.3  Furthermore, the five–four opinion created 
a presumption against such a right in civil cases and fashioned a nearly 
impossible test for overcoming that presumption.4 
But what happened on the other continent—Europe?  Two years before 
Lassiter, in the case of Airey v. Ireland, the European Court of Human 
Rights (European Court) considered the same fundamental issue in the case 
of Airey v. Ireland.5  The European Court reached the opposite conclusion, 
holding the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention) and its guarantee of a “fair hearing” in 
civil cases required the government to provide free counsel to indigent civil 
litigants, even though Ms. Airey’s case “only” involved her marital status 
and right to financial support and other property rights.6 
This leads to an obvious question: what is it about the U.S. Constitution 
that is so different from the European Convention?  The U.S. Constitution 
guarantees American civil litigants due process.7  Similarly, the European 
Convention guarantees European civil litigants a fair hearing.8  What is in 
the language used in these two fundamental documents that might lead 
courts interpreting those words to reach very different answers to such a 
basic question?  Is due process really something less than a fair hearing?  
Or, are the two terms merely different ways of expressing the same basic 
concept? 
This question, in turn, leads back to that previously mentioned 1978 
article on the right to counsel in civil cases and asks what might be learned 
by exploring the same fundamental question from a broader perspective—a 
perspective that takes into account what we share with other democracies 
and what we may have to learn from those nations on this issue.  The 
following pages first explore the common source of the language expressing 
the essential ingredients of the process used to resolve civil disputes found 
in the constitutions of nearly every democratic nation on the face of the 
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Earth.  The article then discusses how supreme courts in different 
jurisdictions have interpreted the constitutional language that emerged from 
this common source.  Next, the article explains the difference between an 
absolute “right to counsel” in criminal cases and a “right to equal justice” in 
civil cases, and explores how the latter might be administered.  Finally, the 
article inquires whether the developing global consensus on this issue may 
ever influence our own country’s constitutional jurisprudence. 
I.  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND ITS “PRECEPT” THAT GOVERNMENT 
IS TO PROVIDE EQUAL JUSTICE TO ALL ECONOMIC CLASSES 
The search for the source of the relevant constitutional language begins 
not on this continent or in this century, but in Europe in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  It was the intellectual ferment during those centuries 
that produced the theory so influential with the drafters of nearly all the 
constitutions found in the Western democracies—including our own.  At 
that time, most European nations had been ruled for centuries by kings and 
emperors, absolute monarchs who claimed the source of their power 
descended from God, and consequently they possessed a divine right to 
govern the lesser mortals who populated their countries.  Finally, many of 
those lesser mortals had had enough.  All across Europe, thoughts of 
revolution—violent and political—were in the air.  Still, the revolutionaries 
lacked a satisfactory rationale to counter the religious-based divine right 
theory. 
Then a group of brilliant political philosophers began espousing one 
version or another of a brand new vision—the social contract.  As men like 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke explained, a 
government’s right to govern did not descend from God in his heavens, but 
from the consent of the governed right here on earth.  These philosophers 
argued individual citizens surrendered their rights, including their right to 
settle disputes through the use of force, only in exchange for a sovereign’s 
promise to provide all of those citizens justice, peace, and the possibility of 
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a better life.  Although these philosophers tended to differ around the edges 
and in other areas about exactly what this promise entailed, they all 
subscribed to the fundamental notion of what they called the “social 
contract”—an agreement among a nation’s individual citizens and between 
those citizens and that nation’s government. 
As John Locke, perhaps the social contract thinker most influential upon 
the founding fathers of our nation, explained: 
[P]olitical power is that power which every man having in the state 
of nature has given up into the hands of the society. . .with this 
express or tacit trust that it shall be employed for their good and 
the preservation of their property. . .as he thinks good . . .and to 
punish the breach of the law of nature in others. . . . [This power] 
can have no other end or measure when in the hands of the 
magistrate but to preserve the members of that society in their 
lives, liberties, and possessions. . . . And this power has its origins 
only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those 
who make up the community.9 
 Other social contract theorists, like Rousseau and Hobbes, echoed 
Locke’s words.  For example, the following passage stresses one of the key 
obligations Hobbes believed the social contract imposed on the sovereign, 
e.g., any government. 
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him or them 
that have the Sovereign Power, that Justice be equally 
administered to all degree of People; that is, that as well the rich, 
and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the 
injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of 
impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the 
meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them; 
For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the 
Law of Nature, a Sovereign is. . . subject. . .10 
The import of these expressions of social contract theory is this 
fundamental precept: citizens would not give up their natural right to settle 
disputes through force unless the sovereign offered a peaceful alternative in 
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which they have a fair chance to prevail if in the right, no matter whether 
they are rich, poor, or something in between.  Society, in turn, breaches this 
social contract if its forums favor one citizen over the other.  The disfavored 
person cannot be presumed to have agreed to submit to an unjust 
sovereign.11  Thus, the equal administration of justice among different 
economic classes is an essential underpinning of any society purportedly 
resting on the consent of the governed.12 
Over the next hundred years, the social contract theories of these political 
philosophers and their revolutionary ideas swept across the European 
continent.  During the 1800s, several emperors and kings either fell before 
the sway of the social contract, or bowed to its terms, thus transforming 
from absolute monarchs to constitutional monarchs.  Even when these 
monarchs did not bow down, most found it necessary to abide by the core 
terms of the social contract.  This included complying with what Thomas 
Hobbes termed a “Precept of the Law of Nature”—equal justice for the poor 
and the rich alike.13   
Nation after nation actualized this Precept by adopting statutory rights to 
counsel in civil as well as criminal cases.  It is true the English Parliament 
had anticipated the social contract by creating such a right in 1495, 
centuries before political theorists had conceived that theory.14  But the 
social contract theory undoubtedly influenced the continental European 
countries as they followed suit in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  France enacted a statutory civil right to counsel in 1851,15 Italy 
embodied that right in its procedural laws at the moment of its birth as a 
nation in 1865,16 and Germany also enacted a right to civil counsel when it 
became a nation in 1877.17  Most of the rest of Europe was not far behind.18 
Notably, when first enacted, none of these statutes provided government 
funding for the legal representation they guaranteed.  Rather, the 
government drafted private lawyers for this purpose, requiring them to serve 
without compensation in return for the privilege of practicing law and 
earning fees from those clients who could afford to pay.  In most countries, 
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it was the twentieth century before governments began paying for the right 
they had created, and some still do not.19 
II.  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT YIELDS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
OF FAIR HEARINGS AND “EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW” IN THOSE 
HEARINGS 
This article is not concerned with statutory rights, except as evidence 
European governments accepted the social contract’s mandate justice must 
be administered equally to the poor and the rich, and recognized this meant 
they had to provide free lawyers to those who could not afford one.  Of 
more relevance is the fact this basic “precept” of the social contract also 
found its way into the constitutions or “basic laws” of several European 
nations.  These documents were drafted by practical politicians, not social 
contract theorists.  Yet, it would have been difficult for those politicians to 
be ignorant of that then prevalent political theory or its basic principles.  As 
might be expected, therefore, these constitutions nearly always included 
guarantees all citizens were “equal before the law” or in all judicial 
proceedings they were guaranteed “fair trials.”20  All of this was a natural 
outgrowth of the social contract and one of its key precepts requiring the 
sovereign to provide equal justice to poor and rich alike. 
The influence of the social contract did not end at the shores of the 
European continent.  This fundamental concept and all that flowed from it 
also crossed the Atlantic Ocean to the restless English colonies on the 
eastern seaboard of North America.  Although the American public is often 
told the Founding Fathers invented the ideas embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence and the U.S. Constitution, most historians credit the social 
contract philosophers, and especially John Locke, with many of those 
concepts.21  Jefferson himself said that Locke was one of the three greatest 
men in all of history (the others being Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton),22 
and several of the most renowned passages in the Declaration are 
paraphrases of Locke’s writings.23  Perhaps even more significant for 
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present purposes, one noted historian observed, “Locke was an intellectual 
godparent of James Madison, the Father of the Constitution.”24  Similarly, a 
leading political scientist insisted, “Locke is our political philosopher. . .we 
can recognize in his work [among other key elements] our insistence on the 
rule of law. . .”25 
Because social contract theory and the general precept that governments 
must dispense justice equally to the rich and the poor were so influential 
with those who drafted this nation’s Constitution, it is no surprise that the 
Preamble to the U.S. Constitution sets forth “To Establish Justice” as one of 
the nation’s four primary goals.26  Nor is it surprising, given the importance 
of the social contract, that the Bill of Rights guarantees all U.S. citizens due 
process in any judicial proceedings where their “life, liberty, or property” is 
at stake.27 
European constitutions may have phrased this guarantee in terms of a 
“fair hearing” while the Founding Fathers spoke of “due process,” but it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern a difference.  As Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes observed in one of his more self-evident pronouncements, 
“Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase ‘due 
process of law,’ there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental 
conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be heard.”28 
After the Civil War, the United States also added the analog of another 
guarantee which many European countries had already adopted in order to 
implement the social contract.  As mentioned earlier, some European 
constitutions guaranteed their citizens, including the poorest, “equality 
before the law.”  In the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Constitution came 
to guarantee all citizens “equal protection of the laws.”  Where due process 
promises litigants—poor, rich and middle-class alike—that they will enjoy 
a fair hearing in the courts, the Equal Protection Clause promises those 
litigants they will have “like access” to court proceedings.  That is, all 
litigants will stand on an equal footing and have an equal chance of 
prevailing if in the right.  As the Supreme Court explained long ago: 
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The Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that no State “shall 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws,” undoubtedly intended. . .that equal 
protection and security should be given to all. . .that they should 
have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of 
their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, 
and the enforcement of contracts. . . .29  
Thus, the language of our Equal Protection Clause and the “equality 
before the law” clauses of some European constitutions may differ slightly 
in the words they use, but the import of these constitutional clauses remains 
identical.  This is not surprising, considering the United States Constitution 
and these European constitutions share a common source—the social 
contract. 
III.  TWENTIETH CENTURY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL “FAIR HEARING” AND “EQUALITY” GUARANTEES 
ON THREE CONTINENTS 
The social contract theory was born in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  Many nations embodied the basic fair hearing and equality 
before the law guarantees in their constitutions or basic laws in the 
nineteenth century.  But it was the twentieth century before courts began 
interpreting the constitutional language and deciding if and when those 
clauses required governments to supply free lawyers to their lower income 
citizens.  In the past sixty-six years, courts on three continents—Europe, 
North America, and Africa—have addressed this issue. 
A.  Europe 
The Swiss Supreme Court was the first of the European courts to 
confront the issue whether the constitutional guarantees derived from the 
social contract require the state to provide free lawyers to litigants who 
cannot afford their own.  The year was 1937, a full quarter-century before 
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the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright30 which granted 
criminal defendants in this country a right to free counsel.  The Swiss case, 
however, did not involve a criminal defendant.  Rather, it was an indigent 
civil litigant who stood before the court and asked the judges to appoint 
counsel to protect his legal rights. 
Switzerland is especially instructive for the United States, because like 
our country, it is a union of sovereign geographical entities all operating 
under the legal umbrella of a federal constitution.  In fact, Switzerland is a 
confederation in political terms, a looser union than our federal system.  
What we call states, Switzerland calls “cantons,” and the Swiss Supreme 
Court tends to be reluctant to dictate to the governments of those cantons.   
The cantons are subject to the federal constitution, however, and to the 
federal Supreme Court’s interpretations of that constitution.  The Swiss 
federal constitution is one of those containing a guarantee of equality before 
the law.  It provides: “All Swiss are equal before the law.”31  In a case 
entitled simply, Judgment of Oct. 8, 1937, the Swiss Supreme Court 
concluded that poor people could not be equal before the law in the regular 
civil courts, unless they had lawyers just like the rest of the citizenry.  The 
court reasoned the constitutional “principle of [equality] before the law” 
requires the cantons to provide a free lawyer “in a civil matter where the 
handling of the trial demands knowledge of the law.”32  In subsequent 
decisions the Swiss Supreme Court has explained and expanded the 
circumstances when cantonal governments must supply tax-funded lawyers 
to poor civil litigants.33  In what would be considered an anomaly in this 
country, it was 1972 before the Swiss Supreme Court held criminal 
defendants had a similar constitutional right to free counsel.34 
The high courts of other European nations have not been called upon to 
decide whether their constitutions (or basic laws) guarantee a right to 
counsel in civil cases—but for a simple reason.  As discussed earlier, most 
of these nations have had statutory guarantees for decades or centuries.35  
The German Constitutional Court, however, did confront the issue at least 
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once.  In its Decision of June 17, 1953, the German Constitutional Court 
made it clear that Germany’s constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing in 
civil cases may require appointment of free counsel for poor people where 
the legal aid statute does not.36 
The Swiss and German right to counsel decisions proved to be early 
precursors of a ruling with implications across the entire European 
continent.37  In 1979, Ireland was almost unique among European countries 
in having no legal aid program of any kind.  So when an indigent wife, Ms. 
Airey, wanted to file a judicial separation suit against her husband, she 
could not get a lawyer.  When she asked the trial court to appoint counsel, 
the judge refused, explaining that Ireland did not provide free counsel to 
indigents in civil cases.  The court instead invited Ms. Airey to represent 
herself in that court.  When Ms. Airey appealed the denial of counsel to the 
Irish Supreme Court the result was the same, and she received the same 
explanation.  However, Ms. Airey had one last place to go—the European 
Court of Human Rights, in effect the Supreme Court of Europe on questions 
of individual rights.  (Ms. Airey also had the good fortune of being 
represented before the European Court of Human Rights by a former 
President of Ireland.) 
The European Court of Human Rights interprets and enforces the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 38—the 
equivalent of our Bill of Rights—which all members of the European 
Community and a number of other European countries have signed.  At this 
point, forty-five nations are governed by this Convention and bound by the 
European Court of Human Right’s interpretations of the Convention’s 
provisions.39 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not guarantee indigent 
civil litigants a right to free counsel in so many words.  Nevertheless, 
consistent with a fundamental precept of the social contract, Article Six of 
the Convention does guarantee all civil litigants a fair hearing.40  In Airey, 
the European Court asked whether a person could receive a fair hearing in 
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the regular courts without the assistance of a lawyer.  After examining that 
question from several angles, the European Court concluded the answer was 
no, and held the fair hearing guarantee of the European Convention required 
the member governments to provide free counsel to those unable to afford 
their own.41  In the course of its opinion in Airey, the European Court issued 
an unusually powerful statement about government’s affirmative obligation 
to provide equal access to justice for low-income citizens: 
The Convention was intended to guarantee rights that were 
practical and effective, particularly in respect of the right of access 
to the courts, in view of its prominent place in a democratic 
society….  The possibility of appearing in person before the [trial 
court] did not provide an effective right of access.42 
The [Irish] Government maintain that. . .in the present case there 
is no positive obstacle emanating from the State and no deliberate 
attempt by the State to impede access: the alleged lack of access to 
the court stems not from any act on the part of authorities but 
solely from Mrs. Airey’s personal circumstances, a matter for 
which Ireland cannot be held responsible under the Convention.  
 [T]he Court does not agree. . . . In the first place, hindrance in 
fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment. 
Furthermore, fulfillment of a duty under the Convention on 
occasion necessitates some positive action on the part of the State; 
in such circumstances, the State cannot simply remain passive, and 
‘there is. . .no room to distinguish between acts and omissions.’  
The obligation to secure an effective right of access to the courts 
falls into this category of duty.43 
As will be explored in more detail within,44 it is interesting to note that in 
deciding that effective access in civil cases requires representation by a 
lawyer, the European Court discussed many of the same factors to justify a 
right to counsel in civil cases as the U.S. Supreme Court had discussed in 
Gideon v. Wainright to justify a right to counsel in criminal cases in our 
country.  The European Court mentioned that the other side in most of these 
cases had elected to have lawyers, that most civil litigants who were on the 
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same side but could afford lawyers in fact employed them, and that the 
procedures and substantive legal rules were relatively complex.45  In 
ordinary civil litigation in the ordinary civil courts, the European Court held 
that governments must provide free lawyers to indigent civil litigants.46  
This ruling now controls litigation for some forty-five nations across the 
continent of Europe, comprising the majority of the World’s western 
industrial democracies. 
B.  North America 
Closer to home and just four years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
a case closely paralleling the facts of Lassiter, found a constitutional right to 
counsel in the fair hearing requirement of Canada’s first written 
constitution, the relatively new “Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”47   
Like Lassiter, the Canadian case, J.G. v. New Brunswick,48 arose when 
the government sought to deprive a mother of her children.  In the Canadian 
case, however, the province of New Brunswick only sought to continue its 
custody over the children for another six months.  Had the government tried 
to permanently deprive the mother of her parental rights—the stakes 
involved in Lassiter—the New Brunswick legal aid law would have 
guaranteed the woman free counsel.  Furthermore, even in a temporary 
deprivation case like this, most other Canadian provinces would have 
entitled the mother to legal aid as a matter of statutory law.  But New 
Brunswick, which has one of the least generously funded legal aid programs 
in Canada,49 denied free counsel to poor mothers where they only stood to 
lose custody temporarily.  
The Canadian Supreme Court ultimately held the New Brunswick 
government was constitutionally required to supply indigent parents with 
free counsel whenever it proposed to assume or maintain custody of their 
children—permanently or temporarily.50  Chief Justice Lamer authored the 
principal opinion and first had to address a threshold issue not presented by 
the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.  While our constitution 
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specifically confers its procedural protections on a person’s “life, liberty, 
and property,” the relevant provision of the Canadian Charter only extends 
to life, liberty, and “security of the person.” 
Does the temporary loss of custody of one’s child fit any of these 
categories in the Canadian Charter of Rights?  Chief Justice Lamer 
answered in the following terms: 
 [T]he right to security of the person protects ‘both the physical 
and psychological integrity of the individual’. . .51 
For a restriction of security of the person to be made out. . .the 
impugned state action must have a serious and profound effect on a 
person’s psychological integrity. The effects of the state 
interference must be assessed objectively, with a view to their 
impact on the psychological integrity of a person of reasonable 
sensibility.52. . . [D]irect state interference with the parent-child 
relationship. . .is a gross intrusion into a private and intimate 
sphere.  Further, the parent is often stigmatized as ‘unfit’ when 
relieved of custody.  As an individual’s status as a parent is often 
fundamental to personal identity, the stigma and distress resulting 
from a loss of parental status is a particularly serious consequence 
of the state’s conduct.53 
Chief Justice Lamer then turned to the critical issue: what does the Charter 
guarantee when the state files a custody application? 
Section 7 guarantees every parent the right to a fair hearing when 
the state seeks to obtain custody of their children.54. . . For the 
hearing to be fair, the parent must have an opportunity to present 
his or her case effectively.  Effective parental participation at the 
hearing is essential for determining the best interests of the child in 
circumstances where the parent seeks to maintain custody of the 
child.55  [The statutory scheme] allows parents to be present at and 
participate in the hearing, with or without counsel, hear all the 
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and present evidence and 
make other representations to the court.  However, it does not 
provide for the payment of legal fees incurred by parents with 
respect to an application by [the state].56  In the circumstances of 
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this case, the appellant’s right to a fair hearing required that she be 
represented by counsel.57 
Larmer reached this conclusion by considering the following factors: “the 
seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings and 
the capacities of [J.G.].”58 
So, the Supreme Court of Canada, the only other common law country on 
our own continent, has joined the highest court on the European continent in 
finding that poor people cannot get a constitutionally guaranteed fair 
hearing in the regular courts unless represented by a lawyer.  True, the 
Canadian Supreme Court has yet to confront this issue in the context of 
cases involving property rights.  Yet, it is significant that the Canadian court 
in 1999 found a right to counsel when a personal right, lesser than the right 
involved in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Lassiter, was at 
stake. 
C.  Africa 
It is not only democracies in Europe and North America that are 
beginning to join this global consensus.  In 2001, on the continent of Africa, 
one of the world’s newest democracies, South Africa, reached this issue in 
the case of Nkuzi v. The Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
The Legal Aid Board. 59  This time, the issue was not heard by the nation’s 
Supreme Court, but by the Land Claims Court of South Africa.  And in this 
case, unlike J.G. v. New Brunswick, purely property rights were at stake. 
The Land Claims Court has jurisdiction over eviction actions between 
tenants or occupiers of land and those asserting ownership.  Most of those 
tenants or occupiers are poor, uneducated blacks, while those bringing the 
eviction actions tend to be wealthy whites.  In an action filed by the Legal 
Resource Centre, a South African public interest law firm, the tenants 
sought a declaration requiring the appointment of free counsel in land 
eviction cases where the litigant could not afford counsel, as well as a 
requirement that the judge advise those litigants they possessed this right.  
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Perhaps because it is such a new democracy, South Africa’s court was 
humble enough to look far beyond its own borders and precedents for 
guidance.  The brief the tenants’ counsel filed was unusually sophisticated 
and informed the judges about nearly all the judicial decisions and 
reasoning from Europe and North America discussed in this article. 
The opinion itself was relatively brief, but two sentences from those two 
pages were enough for the Land Claims Court of South Africa to capture 
the essence of the rationale for a right to counsel in civil cases.  It found that 
“There is no logical basis for distinguishing between criminal and civil 
matters.  The issues in civil matters are equally complex and the laws and 
procedures difficult to understand.”60  Accordingly, the court declared: 
  The persons who have a right to security of tenure in terms of 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, Act 62 of 1997 and the 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, Act 3 of 1996, and whose 
security of tenure is threatened or has been infringed, have a right 
to legal representation or legal aid at State expense if substantial 
injustice would otherwise result, and if they cannot reasonably 
afford the cost thereof from their own resources. . . . 
. . .The State is under a duty to provide such legal representation or 
legal aid through mechanisms selected by it.61 
Significantly, neither the South African government nor the Legal Aid 
Board appealed the Nkuzi decision to a higher court.  Consequently, the 
ruling is being followed and enforced in all land eviction cases.62  Thus, the 
globalization of this constitutional value continues apace with five 
decisions, on three continents, in the sixty-six years since the Swiss 
Supreme Court first declared its constitutional guarantee of equality before 
the law mandated appointment of free counsel for indigent civil litigants.  
Five decisions, covering hundreds of millions of people on this planet, all 
have reached the same conclusion.  No western court, outside the borders of 
the United States, has been willing to find that an indigent civil litigant can 
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obtain a fair hearing or equal treatment in the regular courts unless 
represented by a lawyer.  
Before considering whether these foreign decisions may ever have any 
relevance in the United States, it is important to recognize the precise nature 
of the right they have declared.  It is a different and more complex right 
than the one our Supreme Court’s Gideon decision conferred on criminal 
defendants.  Thus, if Gideon’s trumpet is to sound for civil cases, it will 
play a different and more complicated melody.  
IV.  A “RIGHT TO COUNSEL” IN SOME CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IS NOT 
THE SAME AS A “RIGHT TO EQUAL JUSTICE” IN ALL CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS 
As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in criminal cases, the 
Constitution guarantees an absolute right to counsel; that is, to 
representation by a full-fledged lawyer in all cases.63  This is a simple and 
straightforward, although quite expensive, right to enforce.  In criminal 
cases, this right is easily justified, not only by the seriousness of criminal 
penalties, but also by the complexity of the criminal process.  The 
Constitution not only guarantees counsel, but also dictates the essential 
elements of criminal procedure that make the assistance of counsel essential 
to equal justice for criminal defendants. 
In its broad outlines, the American criminal process represents a single 
standard method of deciding guilt and innocence.  The model is distinctly 
adversarial.  It features such elements as: jury trials; complex rules of 
evidence; constitutional rights against self-incrimination and illegally 
obtained evidence that must be raised or waived in the heat of the 
courtroom battle; ever more intricate and onerous sentencing schemes; and 
a dozen other guaranteed, or at least universal elements that make self-
representation, or representation by anything less than a skilled lawyer, a 
foolish alternative.  
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In contrast, the civil—or, more accurately, the non-criminal—arena is far 
more diverse.  There is no single model—but rather a panoply of models 
(and potential models) for resolving disputes.  The regular civil courts, the 
forums in which traditional contract, tort, and property litigation occur, are 
every bit as complex as the criminal courts, indeed often more so.  Hence, 
lawyers are as essential for civil litigants in these forums as they are for 
criminal defendants in criminal trials.  As the European Court emphasized, 
in these proceedings the assistance of a lawyer is essential to a fair hearing 
and to effective access to justice.64  Consequently, it seems reasonable to 
expect any right to equal justice in civil cases to be co-extensive with the 
right to counsel when appearing in the regular civil court.   
What should be the rule, however, in the many civil forums where 
lawyers arguably are not essential for disputants to get a fair chance?  At 
one extreme, some states actually bar lawyers from representing litigants in 
small claims courts.65  Rich, poor and middle-class alike must present their 
own cases.  Presumably, there are also other forums, including some 
officially called “courts,” that are or could be designed to afford non-
lawyers equal justice without the assistance of counsel.66   
In a less renowned section of its Airey decision, the European Court 
recognized this possibility: 
[W]hilst Article 6 para. 1 guarantees to litigants an effective right 
of access to the courts for the determination of their ‘civil rights 
and obligations,’ it leaves to the State a free choice of the means to 
be used towards this end.  The institution of a legal aid scheme—
which Ireland now envisages in family law matters—constitutes 
one of those means but there are others such as, for example, a 
simplification of procedure.  In any event, it is not the Court’s 
function to indicate, let alone dictate, which measures should be 
taken; all that the Convention requires is that an individual should 
enjoy his effective right of access to the courts in conditions not at 
variance with Article 6 (1).67 
218 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights qualified its holding, 
requiring member governments to provide free counsel to indigent litigants 
in civil cases.  The Court mandated counsel only in cases where the 
procedures or the substantive law is sufficiently complex that the expertise 
of lawyers makes a substantial difference to the litigant’s chances of 
success.  The holding left open the option for governments to offer forums 
where poor litigants could enjoy effective access to justice without legal 
counsel.  Thus, what the European Court of Human Rights announced for 
the signatory nations to the European Convention was not a right to counsel 
as such, but more accurately a right to equal justice in civil cases.  
The other foreign decisions discussed above are likewise compatible with 
a constitutional right to equal justice, but not an absolute right to counsel in 
all civil cases.  As in Airey, all of these constitutional decisions involved 
proceedings in the regular civil courts, and thus did not directly consider 
whether government was required to provide free counsel to indigents in 
other forums that resolve civil disputes.  All the decisions contained 
language suggesting, or at least implying, the right to counsel would not 
apply in forums where proceedings were so simple that a disputant had a 
fair chance for justice without a lawyer’s knowledge and expertise.  For 
example, the Swiss Supreme Court specifically limited their citizens’ right 
to counsel to cases where “the handling of the trial demands knowledge of 
the law.”68  The Canadian Supreme Court went to considerable length to 
establish that assistance of counsel was essential to a fair hearing in forums 
(in this instance the regular civil courts) where the government seeks to 
justify retaining custody of a parent’s child.69  Finally, the South African 
Land Reform Court found the land eviction proceedings before it to be no 
different in complexity from a criminal trial, and consequently no less 
demanding of legal counsel if litigants are to have the fair hearing that 
South Africa’s constitutional mandates.70 
In one sense, the possibility of satisfying this constitutional imperative, 
short of declaring an absolute right to counsel in civil cases, could make it 
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easier for an appellate court to recognize such a right.  After all, in doing so, 
the courts would not be mandating government pay for a lawyer in each and 
every civil dispute involving an indigent on one side or the other.  Instead, 
they would be limiting the mandate to cases and forums where disputants 
cannot obtain a fair hearing unless assisted by a lawyer.  Moreover, if the 
legislative branch considered it too expensive to pay for lawyers in certain 
categories of disputes, it could reserve the option of devising forums where 
people could get a fair hearing and enjoy effective access without the help 
of a lawyer.  
Yet, in another sense, this possibility complicates the articulation, and 
certainly the administration, of such a right.  If the judgment of whether a 
proceeding satisfies this right to equal justice is to be made retrospectively 
on a case-by-case basis, the right becomes virtually meaningless.  Low-
income clients denied counsel would be forced to appeal that denial to the 
appellate courts to learn whether their particular circumstances meant they 
had been deprived of their constitutional right to equal justice.  Only rarely 
would such an appellate challenge be feasible—primarily when a legal aid 
organization chose to allocate a portion of its limited resources to take that 
appeal for the indigent litigant.  Consequently, as a practical matter, trial 
courts and other forums would be free to adopt their own interpretations of 
whether the constitutional right to justice required the provision of free 
counsel to indigents appearing in their proceedings. 
Thus, if they are to guarantee truly effective access to low income civil 
litigants, appellate courts would not only have to recognize a right to equal 
justice, but also over time establish definitive standards.  Those standards 
would have to define when legal representation was required and when 
justice could be achieved without providing poor people with free counsel.  
In some instances, justice might be achieved by providing less expensive, 
non-lawyer advocates,71 and in others, by designing forums that truly 
operate fairly without trained advocates of any kind.72  In all likelihood, the 
latter would mean a shift from an adversarial model to an inquisitorial 
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model of dispute resolution in those forums, in which the judge or other 
decision-maker rather than the parties bore the primary responsibility for 
uncovering and presenting the facts, as well as identifying the relevant legal 
principles. 
It may be tempting for appellate courts to draw such a test in broad 
strokes, for instance, to hold counsel is required in all cases heard in 
“courts,” but not in other forums.  This approach disregards the reality that 
legal assistance may be required for effective access to justice even in 
forums other than the courts.  Meanwhile, some forums labeled as courts, 
such as California’s Small Claims Courts, may be far fairer to 
unrepresented disputants than arbitration, most administrative bodies, and 
similar non-judicial tribunals. 
Another, perhaps more sound, approach would be to articulate an over-
arching standard accompanied by a presumption and verified by empirical 
testing.  The overarching test?  What the European Court stated so artfully: 
all disputants are entitled to effective access to the court or other dispute-
resolving forum.  The presumption?  Virtually the opposite of the 
presumption the U.S. Supreme Court majority announced in Lassiter: a 
presumption that effective access requires the government to supply free 
representation by a lawyer, or a non-lawyer representative where sufficient, 
to those who are unable to afford their own representation in all non-
criminal cases.   
This presumption could only be overcome where a court can legitimately 
certify the particular forum deciding the dispute can and does provide a fair 
and equal opportunity for justice to those who lack such representation.  For 
obvious reasons, it would be virtually impossible to overcome this 
presumption in a dispute where the other side was represented.73  Likewise, 
it would be rare in cases where nearly everyone on the same side as the 
indigent disputant, who could afford representation, employs a lawyer or 
other paid representative.  As the Gideon and Airey opinions emphasize,74 
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both of these factors furnish powerful empirical evidence supporting the 
need for representation. 
The more likely candidates for overcoming this presumption would be 
existing or future forums specifically designed to function without lawyers 
or other representation.  In most instances, this would mean forums built 
around an inquisitorial rather than adversarial model of dispute resolution.  
The forum itself, rather than the disputants, would have to absorb the 
primary responsibility for uncovering the facts and legal principles critical 
to a proper decision.  This might represent a difficult, but certainly not 
impossible, transformation for a judicial system and legal profession 
historically committed to the adversarial model.  California’s creation 
several decades ago of small claims courts that bar lawyers or other 
professional representation offers some evidence innovative forums might 
evolve that could offer effective access to justice for disputants lacking 
representation.  Nonetheless, the difficulty of designing dispute resolution 
forums capable of operating fairly and effectively without professional 
representation is suggested by the fact the California small claims system 
has found it necessary to begin employing a coterie of small claims court 
advisors.  Although they do not represent litigants in the courtroom, these 
“advisors” do help litigants assemble the evidence that they will need and 
prepare litigants for their appearances before the small claims court 
judges.75 
Except where forums exist or are created which truly offer disputants 
effective access to justice without representation by counsel, the right to 
equal justice in civil cases, as is true in all criminal cases, requires the 
provision of counsel to those unable to afford their own.  Indeed, only the 
declaration of a guaranteed right to equal justice, and little short of that step, 
appears likely to supply a powerful enough incentive for governments to get 
serious about developing innovative forums calculated to afford 
unrepresented disputants fair and equal access to justice.   
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Europe appears on the verge of incorporating something approaching the 
above formula in the text of its new constitution.  That is, a formula 
guaranteeing legal aid in civil cases while allowing alternative strategies for 
delivering effective access to justice.  The European community currently is 
in the process of considering the adoption of a true continent-wide 
“Constitution,” not just a series of “Conventions” among sovereign nations 
as they have had until now.76  Section 47 of Article II of the draft 
constitution provides: “Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack 
sufficient resources insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective 
access to justice.”77 
This constitutional guarantee essentially places into the body of the 
European Constitution itself the European Court of Human Rights’ 
interpretation of the European Convention’s fair hearing provision.  In 
Airey, that court held the Convention’s fair hearing guarantee meant 
indigent civil litigants were to have effective access to justice, along with 
everyone else.  Furthermore, this required governments to provide free 
lawyers when their services were needed to provide that effective access.  
Shortly, it appears, the European continent will complete the final step in 
the evolution of this right to equal justice from an abstract precept of the 
social contract to a guaranteed practical and effective right fixed in the 
immutable language of a constitutional provision. 
This examination of foreign jurisprudence and constitutional drafting 
brings the discussion to the next question: does any of this make a 
difference for our country?  Will the United States, or any U.S. jurisdiction, 
ever recognize this fundamental guarantee as a constitutional right in civil 
cases? 
V.  THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND FOREIGN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONS 
Will there come a time when the issue our Supreme Court addressed in 
Lassiter is no longer framed solely by the precedents and constitutional 
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values generated within our borders?  When, if ever, will U.S. courts 
acknowledge the broad global consensus about the meaning of fundamental 
concepts like fair hearing, due process, equality before the law, and equal 
protection of the laws?  When, if ever, will the U.S. Supreme Court begin 
looking at the decisions of high courts of other nations and how those courts 
have interpreted constitutional concepts and language also found in our own 
constitution? 
Based on past experience, the possibility our courts would ever refer to 
foreign court decisions interpreting similar constitutional concepts seemed 
remote just a few years ago.  After all, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Lassiter in 1981 without even mentioning the contrary decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Airey.  This despite the fact that Airey 
was filed two years earlier and declared a much broader right to counsel in 
civil cases covering a population even larger than the United States.  
Indeed, until recently, one would struggle to find any U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions in the past two centuries deciding a constitutional issue that even 
bothered to mention the high court opinions of other countries and how they 
construed those nations’ constitutions.78  
Three years ago, however, some light suddenly flickered at the end of the 
tunnel.  At an international conference the World Bank sponsored in June 
2000, two U.S. Supreme Court justices spoke in terms suggesting that they, 
at least, saw value in examining foreign court opinions.  In her speech to 
this assemblage of judges and lawyers from all over the world, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor urged the audience:  
“I would like to see. . .opinions of high courts around the globe, written, 
interpreted in several languages and put on Web sites so that the world can 
see what you’re doing.”79  One would reasonably assume Justice O’Connor 
was expressing not just an idle curiosity in seeing what other nation’s courts 
are doing, but an interest in considering those opinions when deciding cases 
before our Supreme Court. 
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An even more significant prediction of things to come, as it turned out, 
was Justice Anthony Kennedy’s comment at that same conference.  Justice 
Kennedy implicitly promised to pay attention to relevant decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights, if only the judges of that court would 
write fully reasoned opinions.  In his speech, Justice Kennedy called on that 
court to “begin writing decisions which have the capacity and the power to 
inspire and persuade.”80  This comment seemed to suggest Justice Kennedy 
could find opinions of the European Court of Human Rights to qualify as 
persuasive authority in analyzing constitutional issues, if only those 
opinions satisfied his test.  
That these “off the bench” speeches delivered by Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor might prove to be precursors of things to come in the Supreme 
Court’s “on the bench” jurisprudence was confirmed in one of the Court’s 
landmark opinions delivered near the end of the 2002–2003 term.  Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for a six-justice majority in Lawrence v. Texas81 held it 
unconstitutional for states to criminalize homosexual sodomy.  The opinion 
relied heavily on foreign decisions, and in particular, decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights.   
In its Lawrence v. Texas decision, the Supreme Court had to deal with 
Bowers v. Hardwick,82 an opinion it rendered only seventeen years earlier 
upholding the constitutionality of state anti-sodomy laws.  Justice Kennedy 
found it persuasive that several years before Bowers was decided the 
European Court of Human Rights had already found anti-homosexual sex 
laws to be invalid under the European Convention.  As the Lawrence 
majority explained: 
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was 
decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case 
with parallels to Bowers and to today’s case.  An adult male 
resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing 
homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual 
conduct.  The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right.  He 
alleged that he had been questioned, his home had been searched, 
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and he feared criminal prosecution.  The court held that the laws 
proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 
Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981) & ¶ 52.  Authoritative in all countries that are 
members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations 
now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the 
claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.83 
Later in the Lawrence opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized that its 
previous Bowers opinion had adopted a distinctly minority view among 
western democracies on the constitutionality of laws banning homosexual 
conduct.  
[To] the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider 
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in 
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.  The European Court of 
Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.  See P. G. & J. H. v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, & ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Sept. 25, 
2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993); Norris v. 
Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1988).  Other nations, too, have taken 
action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of 
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.  See 
Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12.  The right 
the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral 
part of human freedom in many other countries.  There has been no 
showing that in this country the governmental interest in 
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or 
urgent.84 
Admittedly, this sudden interest in foreign constitutional decisions, and 
especially those coming from the European Court, is not popular with some 
of the present Supreme Court Justices.  However, a clear majority of six 
justices signed Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, in contrast to 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, which only garnered three votes.  In that dissent, 
Scalia rebuked the majority for paying any attention whatsoever to what 
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courts in the rest of the western democracies may have decided on a similar 
constitutional question.  He stated:  
Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence. . .as the 
Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize 
conduct.  The Bowers majority opinion never relied on “values we 
share with a wider civilization,” ante, at 16, but rather rejected the 
claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ 478 U.S. at 
193-94 (emphasis added).  Bowers’ rational-basis holding is 
likewise devoid of any reliance on the views of a ‘wider 
civilization,’ see id. at 196.  The Court’s discussion of these 
foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have 
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaningless 
dicta.  Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court. . .should not 
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’  Foster v. 
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 154 L. Ed. 2d 359, 123 S. Ct. 470, n. (2002) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).85 
Not long after the Supreme Court issued the Lawrence opinion, another 
Justice voiced strong personal support—and hinted at broader support 
within the Supreme Court—for a global approach to constitutional 
adjudication.  On August 4, 2003, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg told the 
American Constitution Society:  
Our island or lone-ranger mentality is beginning to change. . . 
[Supreme Court Justices] are becoming more open to comparative 
and international law perspectives. . . . While you are the American 
Constitution Society, your perspective on constitutional law should 
encompass the world.  We are the losers if we do not both share 
our experiences with and learn from others.86   
In his speech to the World Bank conference in 2000, Justice Kennedy had 
expressed some skepticism about the “capacity and power” of the decisions 
the European Court produced to “inspire and persuade.”  By 2003, however, 
he overcame that reluctance and found persuasive power in Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom and its progeny.87  Yet even accepting Justice Kennedy’s 
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initial challenge to the European Court to write opinions “with the capacity 
to inspire and persuade,” Airey v. Ireland appears to meet that challenge.   
This article already presented some of the reasoning and policy 
considerations supporting the Airey opinion.  To further capture the flavor 
of the opinion, however, it is useful to examine the European Court’s 
explanation for why counsel is so essential to any litigant, rich or poor, in 
the regular courts.  In particular, note how the Airey opinion stresses many 
of the same reasons the U.S. Supreme Court recited in Gideon v. 
Wainwright to support the right to counsel in criminal cases.  
After pointing out the absurdity of considering whether ineffective access 
to the courtroom could possibly satisfy the constitutional requirement of a 
fair hearing, the European Court turned to the critical question of whether 
effective access in civil cases requires representation by a lawyer.  In 
proposing this inquiry, the court stated: “It must therefore be ascertained 
whether Ms. Airey’s appearance before the High Court without the 
assistance of a lawyer would be effective, in the sense of whether she would 
be able to present her case properly and satisfactorily.”88   
The court went on to note: 
It seems certain to the court that the applicant would be at a 
disadvantage if her husband were represented by a lawyer and she 
were not.  Quite apart from this eventuality, it is not realistic, in the 
Court’s opinion to suppose that, in litigation of this nature, the 
applicant could effectively conduct her own case, despite the 
assistance which, as was stressed by the [Irish] Government, the 
judge affords to parties acting in person. . . . 
. . .A specialist in Irish family law. . .regards the High Court as the 
least accessible court … by reason of the fact that ‘the procedure 
for instituting proceedings. . .is complex.’. . . 
Furthermore, litigation of this kind, in addition to involving 
complicated points of law, necessitates proof of adultery, unnatural 
practices or, as in the present case, cruelty; to establish the facts, 
expert evidence may have to be tendered and witnesses may have 
to be found, called and examined. 
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. . .[It is] most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey’s position. . . 
can effectively present his or her own case.  This view is 
corroborated [by the fact] that in each of the 255 judicial 
separation proceedings initiated in Ireland in the period from 
January 1972 to December 1978, without exception, the petitioner 
was represented by a lawyer.89 
 In conclusion, the court took all of the above considerations into account 
when it stated that “the possibility to appear in person before the High Court 
does not provide the applicant with an effective right of access.”90 
Compare now the rationale of the Airey decision with that found in 
Gideon and their relative “capacity to persuade and inspire.”  Just as the 
European Court of Human Rights did when it considered an unrepresented 
litigant’s prospects in civil court, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gideon 
justified its declaration of the constitutional right to counsel in criminal 
cases by stressing the fact that most people of means hire lawyers when 
facing trial in the criminal courts.91  And, like the Airey court, the Gideon 
court utilized the judges’ own familiarity with what is required to find and 
present evidence in a courtroom to draw the conclusion a lawyer’s 
assistance was necessary for the defendant to have an effective defense.92  
But, the Airey court actually went further than the U.S. Supreme Court in 
justifying the need for counsel in civil cases.  The European Court also 
considered expert testimony, demonstrating that the law and procedure were 
so complex a layperson could not represent him or herself  “properly and 
satisfactorily.”93 
Because the Gideon opinion is fairly typical of the “capacity and the 
power to inspire and to persuade” found in U.S. Supreme Court opinions, 
and the depth and quality of the analysis in Gideon and Airey are so similar, 
it appears difficult to discount Airey on that score.  When, as in Airey, a 
decision of the European Court satisfies Justice Kennedy’s test and 
addresses common constitutional language or comparable constitutional 
concepts, that foreign decision would seem to merit serious consideration 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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Indeed, there appears to be more reason to pay attention to Airey when 
attempting to divine the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s due process and 
equal protection clauses as applied to an indigent civil litigant’s right to 
counsel than to consider the European Court’s stance on homosexual sexual 
conduct.  For reasons explored earlier,94 the text of our constitution and the 
European Convention interpreted in Airey derive from the same 
fundamental concept—a key element of the social contract theory both 
documents implement. 
Once the U. S. Supreme Court, or a state supreme court, acknowledges 
that it should pay attention to how foreign courts construe constitutional 
values we share in common, it will be difficult to ignore the growing global 
consensus among jurisdictions with written constitutions, that one of the 
core constitutional values is a right to equal justice.  Moreover, it will be 
equally difficult to ignore the consequence this right to equal justice that 
embraces a right to counsel, at the very least in cases tried in the regular 
courts.  The Swiss Supreme Court, German Supreme Court, European 
Court, Canadian Supreme Court, and South Africa’s Land Claims Court 
have all reached this same conclusion.  These courts saw no alternative but 
to require government to provide free counsel to poor civil litigants, if the 
government were to satisfy the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing or 
equality before the law for those too poor to afford their own lawyers—at 
least in those cases where the substantive or procedural law is sufficiently 
complex as to require a lawyer’s services for a fair and equal chance at 
justice.  
VI.  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, AND 
AMERICA’S POOR  
The evolving global consensus in support of a guaranteed right to equal 
justice also appears to be shared by the American public.  Polls suggest four 
in five Americans believe, erroneously of course, that poor people already 
have a guaranteed right to counsel when sued in the civil courts, just as they 
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do when prosecuted in the criminal courts.95  Clearly, ordinary Americans 
have a very different interpretation of the due process and equal protection 
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution than do the nation’s judges.  It is not 
difficult to understand why.  From kindergarten on, Americans raise their 
right hands and pledge allegiance to a nation promising “justice for all.”  
The constitution they study in school guarantees them that no one can be 
deprived of “property” as well as “life” or “liberty” without due process of 
law.  That same constitution also promises they shall enjoy “equal 
protection of the laws.”  Several times a week, they see the image of the 
U.S. Supreme Court building on their television screens or in the pages of 
their newspapers or magazines.  Featured prominently in that image, they 
see the promise of “Equal Justice Under Law” chiseled in marble over the 
entrance of this grand temple of our judicial system.  
Could it be the citizens of this country are born, or at least raised, with an 
implicit understanding of the social contract and what it must mean for their 
rights and those of their fellow Americans?  That regular citizens, perhaps 
better than lawyers, judges, or law professors, comprehend the terms of the 
social contract they tacitly agree to as members of this democratic society?  
Is it possible most of them could not comprehend why anyone would 
consent to join a society that would deny them equal justice if they were, or 
became, poor?  Are they realistic enough to know no one has a fair chance 
for justice in a typical courtroom unless that person has a lawyer at her 
side?  Certainly, if the answer to the question is yes it would explain why so 
many of our citizens hold the erroneous view that Americans already enjoy 
a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases if they are too poor to employ 
her own.   
Nevertheless, under our system of government, judges, not the general 
public, interpret constitutions.  Constitutional rights are declared by 
Supreme Courts—the U.S. Supreme Court for the entire country and state 
supreme courts for the individual states—and not by the supreme courts of 
Europe, Canada, or any other nation.  Therefore, the American people, and 
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especially America’s poor, can only wait and see if their expectations will 
be realized by the only authority equipped to do so.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This article began with a quote from the Chief Justice of California, 
Ronald George.  In his annual “State of the Judiciary” speech delivered to 
the California legislature, Chief Justice George warned, “If the motto ‘and 
justice for all’ becomes ‘and justice for those who can afford it,’ we threaten 
the very underpinnings of our social contract.”  In a very real sense, this 
article has been an explanation of why this is so.  It has explored the 
intimate and historical connection between “justice for all” (including and 
especially poor people) and the “social contract.”  Deny the first and you 
definitely and profoundly breach the other.  The article has also traced the 
link between the social contract and the fundamental concepts embodied in 
the due process and equal protection provisions of our constitution, and has 
revealed how other societies based on the social contract have interpreted 
those same concepts to require effective access to justice (including free 
lawyers where needed) for all their citizens.  
Unfortunately, for many of this nation’s lower income people—those 
who cannot be served with the limited resources currently devoted to 
providing them representation—the “If” in Justice George’s warning is 
really a “Because.”  That is, “Because the motto ‘and justice for all’ already 
is ‘and justice for those who can afford it,’” we already “threaten the very 
underpinnings of our social contract.” 96  Because of this reality, the social 
contract has been breached and many unfortunate millions are destined to 
be denied justice in America’s courts.97 
Thus, the subject of this article is something more than an academic 
exercise, one inquiring whether a right to equal justice is a part of the social 
contract, whether the constitutional due process and equal protection 
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution implement that right to equal justice, 
and whether that right to equal justice would require free counsel for 
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indigent litigants in many civil cases.  Instead, the subject of this article has 
real consequences for real people.  For without the effective access to 
justice such a right would guarantee, poor people in this country today too 
often unjustly lose their housing, their possessions, their livelihood, their 
children, and nearly everything else that makes life worth living. 
Whether America finally joins the growing consensus among western 
democracies and declares that neither our own social contract nor our 
constitution can continue to tolerate such daily injustices—that question 
only time and our nation’s courts will answer. 
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95  Two polls, conducted in 1991, probed the respondents’ understanding of their 
constitutional rights.  One was sponsored by the California Bar Association [CALIFORNIA 
STATE BAR REPORT, Bar Survey Reveals Widespread Legal Illiteracy, 11 CAL. LAWYER 
68, 69 (1991)] and the other by a national conference commemorating the 200th 
anniversary of the adoption of the Bill of Rights [ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF 
AMERICA, 1991-1992 DESK REFERENCE SUPPLEMENT: COMMEMORATING THE 200TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Karen D. Horsley et al. eds., 
1991)].  Both polls included a form of the question, whether, if the respondent were poor 
and sued in a civil court, would they would have a right to free counsel.  Sixty-nine 
percent of Californians and 79 percent of citizens in the national survey responded, 
erroneously, yes, to that hypothetical.  In both polls, this question elicited the highest rate 
of erroneous responses about the rights that our constitution guarantees. 
96 To his great credit, Chief Justice George has done far more than any other judicial 
leader in California history to narrow that breach in the social contract.  He was largely 
responsible for passage of a law creating the first state government funding of civil legal 
services in California, the “Equal Access Fund.”  He set up a statewide network of 
“family facilitators” to assist unrepresented litigants in family court cases and several 
innovative self-help center experiments.  In the past year, under Justice George’s 
leadership, the court system’s website opened a huge self-help section containing some 
900 pages of content.  Recently, it added a Spanish language section that duplicates all 
the contents of the English language site.  Chief Justice George also has taken several 
steps to encourage expanded pro bono services from the private bar. 
     These initiatives, as well as others, are described in a report the California 
Commission on Access to Justice published in late 2002.  As this report also documents, 
however, despite all of Justice George’s efforts and those of many others, for the majority 
of lower income residents California still remains a state with justice not for them, but 
only “for those who can afford it.”  See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE, The Path to Equal Justice: A Five Year Status Report on Access to Justice in 
California (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_ 
home.jsp (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). 
97 Studies document that 70 to 80 percent of impoverished people with problems 
requiring legal assistance are unable to find a lawyer.  For instance, a recent California 
status report found 72 percent of California’s impoverished with legal problems could not 
be served.  Id. at 29–30. This should not be a surprise, given the fact that on average, 
each legal services lawyer serves a population of nearly 10,000 low-income people—
while the ratio for the rest of Californians is one lawyer for every 245 people. Id. at 31.  
Of the total public and private funds Californians spend on lawyers, less than a half 
percent goes to provide civil legal aid to the nearly 20 percent of residents who are 
eligible for such services.  Id. at 34.  And total expenditures on civil legal aid for the 
more than 6.4 million low-income people in California, are less than a quarter of the 
annual gross income of a single corporate law firm headquartered in that state that serves 
a relative handful of business clients each year.  Id. 
